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BOOK REVIEWS 
The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries, by Michael J. Perry. Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1998. Pp. 162. $35.00 (Hardcover), $14.95 
(Paperback). 
J.L.A. GARCIA, Boston College 
This slender volume (about 106 pp. of text) comprises four chapters, 
each treating succinctly, and sometimes superficially, an important ques-
tion about the possibility, foundations, or nature of human rights. The 
author is a noted professor of law and a liberal Catholic thinker who 
recently has admirably critiqued the 'gag-rule' propounded by neutralist 
liberals against appeals to religious faith in public political discussion. He 
has also argued, less admirably, against orthodox Christian morality'S con-
demnation of homosexual acts. This book follows the same pattern, show-
ing Perry generally right-headed and sometimes incisive in his criticism of 
some contemporary secular theorizing, but revealing him as too willing to 
trim traditional Christian moral thought to accommodate current trends. 
Perry's first question is whether the idea of human rights has an intelli-
gible secular version. He claims the idea of human rights has two "parts," 
first, that everyone is "sacred, inviolable," possessed of "inherent dignity 
and worth, ... an end in himself," and second, that because of this, certain 
things ought be done for everyone, and others ought not be done to them. 
Perry effectively shows the emptiness of legal theorist Ronald Dworkin's 
recent attempt to reinterpret the claim that every human life is sacred 
while dispensing with God. (And with the claim that people ought not be 
killed before birth or when they despair late in life). For Dworkin, a human 
life is sacred because it represents an investment of human and natural cre-
ative work, which he finds wondrous. Perry nicely points out that this "life 
as a masterpiece" - understanding of sacredness does not make its sacred-
ness inhere in human life, and seems to make its value dependent on our 
fleeting, inconsistent, and variable sense of wonder. 
Perry may interpret Dworkin uncharitably in seeing him as making the 
sanctity of human life depend on our feelings. Still, even Dworkin's less 
subjectivist argument to sanctity from the value of the natural and human 
"investment" represented in each human life fails. For any butterfly also 
represents a great natural investment (biological, physico-chemical, clima-
tological, etc.) in its generation and sustenance, yet butterflies lack human 
(or human-like) rights. Moreover, if what is distinctive about humans is the 
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self-investment we make in our lives, then circularity threatens. For it is 
hard to see why human time and effort matter so crucially unless we 
humans are somehow antecedently special. So, human distinctiveness is a 
presupposition of that argument, not its conclusion. 
Some seek to justify human rights by appealing simply to the definition 
of 'moral.' Perry is right that this approach raises the question, 'why be 
moral?' Unfortunately, he regards this question as more serious than it is. 
After all, an adequate response will point out some way in which being 
moral is good, but in a way which the questioner may not care about or 
may care about less than she cares about some competing matter. So, it may 
fail to motivate the individual. The serious question is whether being moral 
is justified. But that is already settled by its being good. Someone whose 
decision against violating other persons is made simply as a means to her 
own personal interest doesn't genuinely respect their rights, and is not acting 
from the moral virtue of justice. Perry appears to recognize that the kind of 
non-interference that Hobbesian accounts justify falls short of genuine 
morality. However, his own preferred "justification" of human rights is also 
in terms of the agent's "flourishing" and is therein also self-interested, and 
instrumental, falling short of full justification for the same reason. What is 
needed here is a dose of Levinas' insight that being moral cannot be merely 
a means to any nonmoral project. We can ask whether being moral, includ-
ing being just in respecting others' rights, can ever "payoff" someone. But 
even if it can, as Jews and Christians believe (and Aristotelians and Stoics 
did too), we must still recognize that being moral is not something we can 
do simply as a means to such a pay-off. To be moral, to be virtuous, is cen-
trally to love and cherish persons for their own sakes, not just divine per-
sons but also human, and not only one's own person but also others'. It is 
not only the religious who can find this the most rewarding life. However, it 
plainly makes no sense to care for others for their own sakes simply in order 
to reap its rewards-whether they are conceived as Hobbes' desire-satisfac-
tion, Epicurus' pleasure, or the "flourishing" Perry borrows from Aristotle. 
This is one reason only those who lose their lives-i.e., abandon them in lov-
ing service-will regain them (Matthew 16). Perry appears not to appreciate 
the way in which "Why be moral?" is a valid theoretical question, but of no 
direct practical import. In any case, Perry needs to clarify whether he thinks 
sacredness is internal to human rights. If so, then the definitional and 
Hobbesian strategies, pace his claim, are not really defenses of human rights 
talk at all, since they purposely eschew human-sanctity. 
I think sanctity-claims may be part of the best defense of human rights, 
since otherwise it is difficult to see why disrespecting people, harming them, 
betraying them, and failing (in one's relationships with) them is so signifi-
cant morally. I am inclined to think that sanctity-claims are not part of 
human rights themselves. If that is right, then definitional and self-regarding 
strategies are genuine accounts of human rights, but poor defenses of them. 
We should note in passing that the claims that there are some things that 
we ought to do to people and other things we ought not do to them, which 
according to Perry are the second part of the idea of human rights, cannot 
themselves suffice for rights talk. They do not specify that the violations are 
morally wrong rather than merely ill-advised, nor that they are acts of 
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wronging, of victimizing. After all, I ought not to destroy my couch, but 
doing so need not be morally wrong. It's just stupid, imprudent. I also 
ought not trash your couch but, again, my trashing it is not a violation of the 
couch's rights. More is needed for human rights than such bare 'ought'-
claims as these. Perry may well be right that human rights can be under-
stood in terms of the kind of 'ought'-claims that natural law grounds. Still, 
he moves too fast in going from these' ought' -claims to human rights talk. 
Perry correctly points out that Rorty's anti-foundationalist position sim-
ply abandons the efforts to justify rights talk. Nevertheless, the brief cri-
tiques of Dworkin, Rorty, and a few other contemporary thinkers only 
skim the surface of recent efforts to defend human rights in our age of neo-
Kantian moral philosophers. In general, there is just too much here on 
Nietzsche. A century since of efforts at a gentler, more loving, more 
respectful post-Christian secular morality gets short shrift. 
Perry's second, and shortest, chapter answers the question whether the 
discourse of international human rights is corrupted in the ways that Mary 
Ann Glendon argues U.S. rights-discourse have become. Perry quotes from 
major rights documents to show that they do not subordinate all other con-
cerns to rights-claims, discredit compromise, abort discussion, shortchange 
such intermediate institutions as family, and so on. Perry largely succeeds 
in his unambitious goal, but his discussion is interesting mainly for what it 
omits. Recently some critics, most notably Glendon herself, have charged 
that international rights discourse is becoming Americanized, especially in 
the Cairo and Beijing U.N. Conferences, and in some responses to the U.N. 
Declaration's fiftieth anniversary. (Recently, a population conference in 
New York insisted on the reproductive "rights" of teenagers.) These critics 
contend that the Clinton Administration and its West European ideological 
allies elevated some lifestyle and sexual rights to the level of inviolability 
and used terminological tricks-especially replacing talk of "family" with 
coded phrases about diverse forms of "families," for instance-to blunt the 
effectiveness of appeal to those institutions against demands to license per-
verse individual "life-style" preferences under the rubric of human rights. 
Since Perry does nothing to address this important contemporary contro-
versy, his discussion here is largely irrelevant. 
The third chapter inquires whether human rights and all other moral 
norms are so relativized to local cultures that appeal to inherent and uni-
versal rights must be wrong-headed. Again, he is on the right side, arguing 
in the negative. Unfortunately, his argument, while touching some impor-
tant but familiar points, does little to advance the discussion. Readers inter-
ested in responding to relativism are better advised looking to Moody-
Adams, Wiredu, Scanlon, et a1. than to Perry's brief treatment. Perry's 
argument is marred by its focus on a straw man, as he expends much of his 
limited space showing that such acts as torture are bad for their victims 
irrespective of the latter's nationality, religion, etc. Plainly, that is not what 
the relativist challenge to human rights is about. Rather, the relativist 
maintains that, while the torture is bad for its victim, that does not always 
suffice to make it a violation of her rights, since she holds that rights are 
cultural creations and may in some societies be withheld from certain or all 
classes of people. So, Perry's discussion here is insufficient and misdirect-
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ed. He further confuses matters by claiming to endorse a form of "cultural 
relativism" himself, though he holds only the uncontroversial position that 
some universal norms will require different conduct in places and cultures 
differently situated. It is not wildly inaccurate to call this 'relativism' but 
doing so certainly obscures issues it ought to clarify. 
Perry abandons the side of good sense altogether in his final chapter. 
Here he responds negatively to the question whether any human rights are 
exceptionless norms. His discussion is confused in its basic terms. He 
notes, for example, that some of the principal documents of human rights 
include ceteris paribus clauses in their affirmation of rights and concludes 
that the rights are not absolute. However, if your doing something to me 
always violates my rights except when you do it for some specific reason 
(whatever that is), then your doing it without that reason is wrong without 
exception. So, Perry is an absolutist too, malgre lui. 
We get the same conclusion from another angle. He sides with the pro-
portionalist moral theologians who hold that one's overriding duty is 
always to promote "the greater good." This is called anti-absolutist, but it 
is plain these thinkers count something as wrong in every instance: pro-
moting a lesser good. The point is that we're all absolutists. The dispute 
is over just which acts are wrong absolutely. Perry warns darkly that 
such absolutists as the Oxford legal theorist John Finnis offer no convinc-
ing defense against the charge that their position is fanatical. However, 
one who, like Perry, professes his approval of doing absolutely anything 
to secure a better result is in no position to call others fanatics. Finnis is 
Perry's special target there, but this misdirects the chapter's discussion. 
Perry makes a fuss over criticizing the claim of Finnis, Germain Grisez, 
and others that life and other fundamental forms of human good are 
"incommensurable" a claim they make to bolster the traditional view that 
lying, blasphemy, and intentionally killing innocents, for example, are 
acts never permissible. Yet even if there is, as it seems reasonable to 
think, some sense in which the result of an act that causes two deaths is 
worse than that of an act that causes just one, it remains to be shown how 
one moves from that observation to the contested view that morality per-
mits and even requires killing one person to save two. That is a question 
not just about the good but about the right and Perry offers no theory to 
back this conclusion. Instead, he maintains, with some misgivings, that 
traditional absolutism is counterintuitive. This is interesting mainly for 
the fact that only a few decades ago even defenders of utilitarianism con-
ceded that it was their anti-traditionalism that offended their readers' 
moral intuitions. Perry may be right that nowadays his readers' intu-
itions are likely to run the other way. I think this shows that the theorist's 
appeal to moral intuitions should be done carefully, with intuitions like 
those Perry (correctly or not) claims duly discounted as rather unreliable 
turns of thought, untested, of unproven staying power or lasting appeal, 
temporally and spatially localized accoutrements to those of a certain 
class and educational background. 
What matters here is that Perry's explicit suggestion that it might 
involve no immorality, no violation of human rights, to threaten and kill 
someone's innocent loved ones to get her to reveal the location of a ter-
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rorist bomb (his example) is wildly and plainly inconsistent with his 
own insistence on the sacredness, sanctity, and inviolability of human 
beings (he uses the three terms as rough equivalents) that grounds 
human rights. His (and, for that matter, any) efforts to overcome this 
incompatibility fail miserably. More important, an inviolability that 
countenances such blatant violations-egregious instances of what Kant 
memorably called treating others "merely as means" -cannot ground any 
human rights that are worth a damn. The reason Perry seems not to see 
this is that he works with an impoverished understanding of love. 
Christian love is love of persons as neighbors, not a devotion to promot-
ing any such dubious abstraction as the greater good. To love anyone is 
to wish her well, and it is not hard to see that intentionally depriving her 
of so fundamental good as her life, solely for the benefit of others, can-
not but be the antithesis of acting lovingly toward her. Of course, we 
cannot in the real world bring every good thing to every person. But 
then it is reasonable to think that love serves to limit the extent to which 
we can licitly set ourselves against anyone person's retaining such fun-
damental goods as life itself without having done anything to cut herself 
off from deserving our consideration. 
It is Perry's fondness for the shallow and inept theorizing of propo-
nents of the discredited moral theological school called 'proportional-
ism' that bogs his discussion down throughout this final chapter. (For a 
critique of this school see the papal encyclical Veritatis Splendor or Chris 
Kaczor's work.) Some legal theorists do even worse by him, leading 
Perry to absurd musing about whether killing innocents for others bene-
fit might be unobjectionable if they might be induced to vote for a policy 
permitting it, or if a majority accepted such an arrangement. None of 
this makes much sense-surely the decent would look to the morality of 
killing for guidance on how to vote, not see it as emerging from the tote-
board. It reveals the emptiness of much of what passes for moral theory 
in this Rawlsian time, when people have become used to the idea that 
moral norms are creatures of hypothetical (and even actual) political 
agreements. Near his book's end, Perry charges Finnis with holding that 
it is better for the whole nation to perish than for one person. Actually, 
this seems to be a misinterpretation of the latter's position, for Finnis' 
claim that fundamental values are not objectively commensurable 
entails that no such comparative judgment of superiority, inferiority, or 
equality can be correct. More important, however, is the fact that Perry 
would make this complaint. Has he given any thought to the context of 
the famous claim that it is better that one man die than the nation? What 
has beclouded our thinking when professed followers of Christ proclaim 
an ethic indistinguishable from the one Caiphas both practiced and 
preached? Perry's morality countenances vicious victimization of some 
for the sake of others; but such single-minded devotion to the purported 
greater good is the code of oppressors. What we need is moral thinking 
that follows not the thinking of the victimizer, but the moral under-
standing of The Victim. 
